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Nygaard, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                I. 
     Appellant Elaine Subbe-Hirt brought this action against her 
former employer, Prudential Insurance Company, and Robert 
Baccigalupi, her former supervisor at Prudential, presenting 
several claims arising out of her employment with Prudential.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on Subbe-Hirt's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  It held alternatively that her claim was 
barred by the exclusive remedy provided by the New Jersey 
Worker's Compensation Act and that, in any event, the claim would 
fail on its merits because defendants' conduct was not 
sufficiently outrageous under New Jersey law.  Subbe-Hirt appeals 
from that ruling. 
                               II. 
     The district court applied a "substantially certain" 
standard to appellant's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; it then found that defendant's conduct did 
not meet the threshold level sufficient to support a cause of 
action for an intentional tort, thereby avoiding the exclusivity 
provisions of the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act.  This was 
incorrect as a matter of law. 
     The district court viewed the applicable legal standard as 
follows: 
     In order for an employee to bring an action against his 
     or her employer based upon an "intentional wrong", 
     thereby escaping the exclusivity of the WCA, the worker 
     must prove that the employer's actions were 
     "substantially certain" to cause the alleged harm. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has required only that a 
plaintiff show deliberate intention to avoid the exclusive remedy 
provided by the Compensation Act.  See Millison v. E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1985).  The Millisoncourt cited 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A to elucidate 
its definition of intent, opining in a parenthetical reference 
that the "meaning of intent is that actor desires to cause 
consequences of his act or is substantially certain that such 
consequences will result from his actions." Id. at 514 (emphasis 
added).   
     Although the Millison court did adopt a "substantial 
certainty" standard, the district court failed to apply the full 
Millison test, under which deliberate intent can be proven by 
either: 1) a desire to cause the consequences of an act; or 2) 
substantial certainty that those consequences will result. 
     Proving that the defendant desired to cause consequences of 
its act is both the most direct and usually the most difficult 
way to show deliberate intent to harm.  The Millison court, 
although focusing on substantial certainty, did not reject this 
more direct means of proving deliberate intention: 
     It may help to perceive "substantial certainty" not so 
     much as a substantive test itself nor as a substitute 
     for a subjective desire to injure, as a specie of 
     evidence that will satisfy the requirement . . . that 
     "deliberate intention" be shown. 
 
Id. at 514 (citation omitted); accord New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. 
v. Joseph Oat Corp., 670 A.2d 1071, 1074 (N.J.Super. 1995) (the 
Millison court "did no more than explain that such deliberate 
intent to injure can be proved not only by evidence of actual 
subjective intent to injure, but also by circumstances where 
injury is a substantial or virtual certainty"); Hambsch v. 
Harrsch, 606 A.2d 879, 883 (N.J. Super. 1991) ("Millison and its 
offspring have skillfully devised a standard based upon either a 
'substantial certainty' to injure or the defendant's actual 
subjective intent to injure."); Bustamante v. Tuliano, 591 A.2d 
694, 699 (N.J. Super. 1991) ("The bar will fall only in the face 
of proof of a subjective intent to injure or a substantial 
certainty that injury will occur.").  Because the district court 
erroneously applied only a substantial certainty test and 
because, as we explain infra, the record contains sufficient 
evidence of direct intent to injure, we hold that the Act does 
not bar appellant's intentional infliction claim. 
                               III. 
     Subbe-Hirt contends that the district court also committed 
legal error by basing its summary judgment on a conclusion that 
defendants' conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to support a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  On this 
allegation of error we have but two issues to decide: 1) whether 
Robert Baccigalupi intended to inflict emotional distress upon 
Elaine Subbe-Hirt; and 2) whether the evidence supports 
appellant's contention that Baccigalupi succeeded in inflicting 
that distress.  We answer both questions in the affirmative and 
hold that the record in this case exceeds a threshold showing of 
outrageous behavior sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
                                A. 
     The present record, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to Subbe-Hirt, shows that Robert Baccigalupi unquestionably 
intended to inflict emotional distress upon Elaine Subbe-Hirt.  
According to sales manager Mark Parisi, Baccigalupi "would berate 
[Subbe-Hirt] or talk about getting her."  Indeed, Baccigalupi 
stated, "I'm going to get her." 
     Moreover, according to the deposition testimony of Parisi 
and sales manager Robert LaNicca, Baccigalupi stated, in the 
presence of other managers and on more than one occasion, that he 
"was going to trim her bush;" a blatantly sexist metaphor to 
brag of how Baccigalupi would handle females in general and 
Subbe-Hirt in particular.  According to sales manager David 
Meyer, "when it was brought to R. Baccigalupi's attention that 
[Subbe-Hirt] was soon going to be returning from disability, R. 
Baccigalupi quickly remarked, 'Well, don't worry about her.  I'm 
going to trim her bush.'"  When asked by counsel to explain what 
he understood Baccigalupi's remark to mean, Meyer testified, "I 
understood it that he was going to lay into her quite hard and 
put her in her place."  LaNicca said that on another occasion 
Baccigalupi stated, "Let's bring Elaine in here on Friday and 
we'll trim her bush."  Parisi understood that phrase to mean: 
 
     That he was going to come down on her, whatever his 
     particular style was, forcing her to either go out on 
     disability or leave the company or to cease the union 
     activity. . . .  [This] is, unfortunately with 
     Prudential, is an avenue that agents take when they 
     can't take the -- you know, when management pressure 
     goes up, and that's what [Baccigalupi] might use that 
     for." 
Likewise, Robert King, a district agent, said: 
 
     There came a point in time where it was almost 
     embarrassing for many of us to watch a woman being -- . 
     . . it was pretty much obvious that Elaine wouldn't and 
     couldn't bear up under the general atmosphere . . . -- 
     her time was expiring. . . .  We talked amongst 
     ourselves that, you know, this was a critical stage . . 
     . .  There was a persecution going of myself and 
     Elaine, and Elaine in particular. . . .  [Baccigalupi 
     said] more or less than [sic] she was history and that 
     if I intended to continue that I would -- I should 
     leave things go as they are going. 
     Baccigalupi's intent to inflict emotional distress can be 
further seen in his total lack of any vestige of compassion for 
any woman in the office.  On one occasion Meyer told Baccigalupi 
that he "couldn't continue performing 'root canal' on women 
agents on his staff because they broke down in tears."  At that 
point, Baccigalupi simply selected a woman agent to abuse as a 
demonstration, saying "Well, don't worry.  I'll show you how to 
handle it."  Appellant describes this contrived encounter as 
follows:   
     He then called one of the women agents in for a review, 
     and started the 'root canal' and the intimidation on 
     her until she broke down and started crying.  R. 
     Baccigalupi kept tearing and pressing into her and when 
     it was over and she had left the office, he was holding 
     out his suspender straps as if to say, "this is how you 
     handle it; don't let their emotions get in your way."  
Indeed, Baccigalupi admitted his intent when he said to Subbe- 
Hirt, "do you know who Joan of Arc is, read between the lines, do 
you know why I'm looking at your work so closely, do you think I 
do this to everyone?"   
     We have no difficulty in concluding that a reasonable jury 
could find from this evidence that Baccigalupi intended that his 
conduct subject Elaine Subbe-Hirt to emotional distress, and will 
turn next to whether Baccigalupi's conduct had its intended 
effect, and whether that effect was sufficient as a matter of law 
to state a claim of intentional infliction. 
                                B. 
                                1. 
     The district court erred when it held that Subbe-Hirt did 
not allege, nor did the record on summary judgment show, conduct 
sufficiently outrageous to state a claim that Baccigalupi had 
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her.  In Buckley 
v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863-64 (N.J. 1988) the 
New Jersey Supreme Court applied the view of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 46 to the tort of intentional infliction.  
The district court was therefore correct that, under New Jersey 
law, intentional infliction of emotional distress comprehends 
conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded 
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d.  We disagree, 
however, with the district court's conclusion that Baccigalupi's 
conduct was not sufficiently outrageous, and are led inexorably 
to the conclusion that summary judgment should have been denied. 
                                2. 
     Elaine Subbe-Hirt began working for Prudential Insurance 
Company as an insurance salesperson in 1984.  Initially, she 
reported to a sales manager, who reported to defendant Robert 
Baccigalupi, the District Manager for the office.  When the sales 
manager to whom she reported left the company, Subbe-Hirt found 
herself reporting directly to Baccigalupi. 
     Baccigalupi created a predatory tactic he descriptively 
termed "root canal," which he used to control older agents such 
as Subbe-Hirt.  Baccigalupi instructed his sales managers how to 
perform this verbal attack "operation."  According to sales 
manager Meyer, Baccigalupi "came up with the concept of root 
canal as a way to intimidate and basically destroy these people 
to the point of submission or of just getting the hell out of the 
business."  Meyer related at his deposition that Baccigalupi 
picked the term "root canal"  
     specifically because it was made to be a very 
     uncomfortable, pain-producing, anxiety-producing 
     procedure that you would keep going deeper and deeper 
     until you struck a nerve, which would either end up in 
     the agent submitting, or reaching the point of anxiety 
     where they just couldn't stand any job any longer. 
     According to Meyer, at Thursday management meetings, sales 
managers would role play with each other how to deal with 
"problem agents:" 
 
     . . . Bob LaNicca had brought up that he was having 
     problems dealing with [Subbe-Hirt].  And then 
     [Baccigalupi] would role play with Bob LaNicca how to 
     perform root canal on Elaine to harass, intimidate her 
     into submitting to management's requests. 
 
     LaNicca's deposition indicates that Subbe-Hirt was "brought 
in more often than others for performance reviews," which was 
Baccigalupi's opportunity for using his root canal procedure on 
her.  According to Subbe-Hirt, Baccigalupi "held [her] in the 
office twice as long as anyone else." 
     Baccigalupi was relentless in his contumely against Subbe- 
Hirt.  To begin with, according to Meyer and Parisi, Baccigalupi 
replaced females' given names, and other polite nouns such as 
"lady" and "woman," with the term "cunt," to depersonalize and 
deride the women in the office.  He would also taunt Subbe-Hirt 
by asking if she "knew the word heretic" and threaten her "by 
asking if she knew who Joan of Arc was."  Moreover, he would ask 
Subbe-Hirt for her resignation almost every time she was in the 
office.  Baccigalupi even went so far as to have an unsigned 
resignation on his desk; we would then ask Subbe-Hirt "why don't 
you sign it; if you don't want to sign it, go on disability." 
     In his meetings with Subbe-Hirt, Baccigalupi would "grill" 
her on work she submitted, asking "why did you do this, what did 
you do here, what was said here?"  If he was not "satisfied" with 
her answer, he would call Subbe-Hirt's clients in front of her 
and say "Elaine says this; what do you say?" 
     Baccigalupi's conduct had a devastating consequence.  After 
one meeting with Baccigalupi, Subbe-Hirt "literally blacked out 
behind the wheel and hit a tractor trailer just from stress and 
emotion[,]" suffering severe injuries that required eight days of 
hospitalization.  This incident forced Subbe-Hirt to take 
temporary disability leave; indeed, her treating psychiatrist has 
opined that she remains totally disabled with post traumatic 
stress disorder triggered by Baccigalupi's badgering and 
intimidation.   
     Baccigalupi was on notice that such an incident was a 
distinct possibility.  Before the collision, Subbe-Hirt had 
consulted with her family doctor because of stress.  The doctor 
wrote a letter which Subbe-Hirt showed to Baccigalupi before the 
incident, asking that it be placed in her personnel file.  It 
stated: 
     Elaine Subbe[-Hirt] is currently under my care for 
     tension syndrome.  It is my opinion, that she is 
     capable of working a regular forty hour week at her 
     present position.  However, she should not be subject 
     [sic] to any undue stress or work load at this time. 
 
     When Subbe-Hirt requested that the letter be placed in her 
personnel file, Baccigalupi refused, his exact words being:  
"I'll decide what goes in your personnel file."  According to the 
evidence, "Mr. Baccigalupi handed it back to [her] and said he 
didn't see that letter, and he never wanted to see it again and 
he wouldn't put it in [her] file."  From this evidence, a jury 
could well-conclude that, in his attempt to drive Subbe-Hirt out 
of Prudential, Baccigalupi targeted her now-documented weakness, 
of which he was fully cognizant.  Such specific targeting of an 
individual's weak point is itself a classic form of "outrageous" 
conduct under Restatement § 46, comment f, which provides: 
 
     The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may 
     arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is 
     peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason 
     of some physical and mental condition or peculiarity.  
     The conduct may be heartless, flagrant, and outrageous 
     when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, 
     where it would not be so if he did not know. 
 
     We conclude that the record is sufficient to support a 
finding that Baccigalupi essentially set out to put Subbe-Hirt 
under unnecessary stress to force her out of the company, all the 
while knowing that her physician had stated specifically that her 
condition required her to avoid such stress.  We hold that the 
evidence described above is more than sufficient to withstand 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.      
                               IV. 
     The allegations about Baccigalupi's uncivil conduct, and the 
record before us display a pattern of ill behavior and 
concomitant distress sufficient to preclude summary judgment.  We 
will reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause to the 









Subbe-Hirt v. Baccigalupi 
No. 95-5786 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
         The decision of the district court dismissing the 
appellant-plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress should be affirmed for two separate and 
distinct reasons:  the claim is clearly within the exclusivity 
provision of New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act (the "WCA" or 
the "Act") and not saved from the Act by the exception which 
permits claims for intentional wrongs.  In addition, the conduct 
allegedly engaged in by the defendant clearly was not so 
outrageous so as to meet the minimal requirements under New 
Jersey law for a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
 
                                I. 
               New Jersey Worker's Compensation Law 
         The New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act provides an 
automatic addition to any employment contract entered into in the 
state, unless the parties at the time of the employment contract 
expressly disclaim that the WCA be part of the employment 
agreement.  N.J.S.A. 34: 15-8.  Under the Act employees are 
barred from pursuing remedies against their employer or the 
employer's agent relating to injuries received by reason of the 
employment relationship, other than a worker's compensation claim 
under the Act.  The pertinent provisions of the WCA, as relevant 
to this matter, states: 
 
         If an injury or death is compensable under 
         this article, a person shall not be liable to 
         anyone at common law or otherwise on account 
         of such injury or death for any act or 
         omission occurring while such person was in 
         the same employ as the person injured or 
         killed, except for intentional wrong. 
 
N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (emphasis added). 
 
All claims by employees who suffered injury or illness by reason 
of their employment must be made pursuant to the administrative 
procedure set forth in the Worker's Compensation Act.  The sole 
exception which the Legislature carved out allowing an employee 
to sue the employer at law, and bypass the administrative 
framework of the Worker's Compensation Act, is if the claim arose 
by reason of an "intentional wrong."  Id. 
         The law in New Jersey is well-settled.  To invoke this 
narrow exception to the Worker's Compensation Act, the employee 
must prove that the action of the employer was substantially 
certain to cause the harm.  Millison v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & 
Co., 101 N.J. 161, 177 (1985), aff'd 115 N.J. 252 (1989).  The 
New Jersey courts have been careful to explain that for an action 
to be "substantially certain" to be the cause of an injury or 
illness, the individual bringing about the injury must be found 
to have known with "virtual certainty" that the act would produce 
the injury.  Bustamante v. Tuliano, 248 N.J. Super. 492, 498 
(App. Div. 1991). 
         Even when considering all inferences which can 
reasonably be drawn from the pleadings and plaintiff's 
affidavits, the district court correctly concluded that the claim 
did not approach the narrow intentional wrong exception which is 
necessary under the Act for an employee to sue an employer at law 
for a work related illness. 
         In order to find refuge from the exclusivity provision 
of the Worker's Compensation Act, an employee suffering from 
emotional distress and disability arising from employment cannot 
avoid the administrative provisions of the Worker's Compensation 
Act by simply characterizing as "intentional" the employer's acts 
which caused the illness.  Even crediting plaintiff's 
allegations, and acknowledging that the conduct of her supervisor 
and employer was offensive and uncalled for, such conduct did not 
constitute an exception to the exclusivity provision of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. 
         The New Jersey Legislature never envisaged that the 
intentional wrong exception would encompass the normal and even 
extreme comments which arise in an employment relationship.  To 
hold, as the majority does today, that criticism and harsh 
statements concerning work practices, competence and ability of 
an employee are sufficient to constitute intentional wrongs 
within the meaning of the Worker's Compensation Act is to be 
insensitive to the realities of the workplace.  The majority 
fails to reckon with true employment reality.  The workplace  
often is a hard-driving environment.  Competitive imperatives may 
call for clear, sometimes insulting language, and one's immediate 
supervisor will often be perceived as crude, impersonal and 
insulting.  The workplace is not afternoon tea or a day at the 
beach.  We should not, and the New Jersey Legislature never 
envisaged that courts would, censor the language or dialogue in 
the workplace. 
         The district court analyzed the parameters of the 
intentional wrong exception and correctly concluded that  
plaintiff's allegations reflect that Baccigalupi engaged in 
conduct which was consistent with behavior or practices sometimes 
engaged in as part of the business environment or employment 
relationship.  The majority may not like the employer's words or 
conduct, and I agree that the words were uncouth and gross.  But, 
like it or not, these are the words which the employer chose, and 
such is the opinion of some employers of their employees.  We 
should not be in the business of scripting dialogue in the 
workplace.   
         Plaintiff relies heavily on Cremen v. Harrah's Marina 
Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.J. 1980).  Cremen is clearly 
distinguishable from this matter.  The plaintiff in Cremen was 
raped by her supervisor who continued to physically abuse her 
with physical as well as mental encounters.  The Cremen court 
correctly concluded that such assaults were not part of the 
landscape in any work environment and that the emotional distress 
which resulted from the conduct was outside of the Worker's 
Compensation Act.  The plaintiff's case before us in its totality 
is based solely on words.  Words not even spoken to her.  Words 
that she claims made her sick and should not have been used to 
describe her performance in the work environment or characterize 
her as an employee.  Plaintiff's allegations are a far cry from 
Cremen.  She can cite no other New Jersey case in which the 
"intentional wrong exception" was found to apply to support her 
position. 
         The plaintiff has failed to allege facts which would 
take the admittedly harsh language out of the work environment.  
All of the remarks leveled by plaintiff's supervisor were 
directed to her work performance and all of his comments concern 
the employment relationship.  Not one of the alleged "intentional 
wrongs" are removed from the proper subject of an employer's 
evaluation and opinions concerning work performance or job 
competence.  While we as individuals may have our view as to the 
proper language that should transpire at a work site, it does not 
lie in the province of the judiciary to instruct employers on 
proper etiquette or set ourselves up as the super-Emily Post of 
the workplace. 
          
                               II. 
         Separate and apart from the allegations of the 
plaintiff not qualifying as an "intentional wrong," the facts of 
the case as alleged by the plaintiff fall short of the New Jersey 
cause of action of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court has defined this tort as requiring 
conduct "so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded 
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."  
Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988).  
The conduct of the perpetrator of such a tort must be by its 
nature "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it."  Id. 
         Conduct which the New Jersey courts have found to meet 
this extremely high level of uncivilized conduct are such matters 
as a doctor knowingly and untruthfully advising parents that 
their child had cancer, Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 317- 
19 (Law Div. 1981); a hospital unable to locate the body of a 
dead baby for three weeks, Muniz v. United Hospitals Medical 
Center, 153 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1977).  The federal court 
has recognized the extreme difficulty of establishing such a 
claim in a mere employment relationship when the conduct alleged 
does not exceed the employer/employee relationship.  See Fregara 
v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 956 (D.N.J. 
1991); Alm v. Marriot Corp., No. 90-3648 WL 313897 (D.N.J. Nov. 
6, 1991); Borecki v. Eastern Intern. Management Corp., 694 F. 
Supp. 47 (D.N.J. 1988).  After Buckley, it has been recognized 
that "New Jersey has prescribed a heavy burden for one alleging 
intentional infliction of emotional distress."  Obendorfer v. 
Gitano Group, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 950 (D.N.J. 1993). 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court has made it abundantly 
clear in Buckley, that when a claim is made for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the trial court must clearly 
exercise a gatekeeping rule:  "the court decides whether as a 
matter of law such emotional distress can be found, and the jury 
decides whether it has in fact been proved.)  Id. at 367.  It is 
the obligation of the trial court to determine in the first 
instance whether the plaintiff has set forth conduct which is 
sufficiently extreme such that a jury could reasonably conclude 
that outrageous conduct permits it to award damages.  Contrary to 
the opinion of the majority, the district court did not overstep 
its role with respect to the claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress since the trial court is mandated under New 
Jersey law to determine in the first instance "whether reasonable 
minds could conclude that that alleged conduct has met 
[outrageous] standard."  See Obendorfer v. Gitano Group, Inc., 
838 F. Supp. at 955; Borecki v. Eastern Intern. Management Corp., 
694 F. Supp. at 61. 
         The district court correctly performed its function by 
determining that under New Jersey law the facts alleged as a 
matter of law failed to reach the elevated and high standard 
required for the cause of action of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  The district court recognized that 
Baccigalupi's statements, if credited, were "inexcusable" and 
"offensive," but did not rise to the level of outrageous and 
unacceptable in a civilized society.  Plaintiff's claims boil 
down to an assertion that her supervisor's choice of words 
required her to put up with "more than the normal pressure of a 
job."  Being subject to "more than normal pressure" at work is a 
long distance from conduct that is "so outrageous in character 
and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community."  Even plaintiff had a difficult time  
labeling Baccigalupi's actions as anything beyond harmless 
threats, intimidation, and ridicule.  Admittedly, the words 
allegedly spoken by Baccigalupi were strong and even harsh at 
times, but they were merely words.  There is no proof, nor even 
an allegation, that Baccigalupi even touched her or that he set 
in motion any physical or other instrumentality to bring about an 
injury or illness. 
 
                               III. 
         The majority is to be lauded in its desire to upgrade 
the repartee of the workplace and to be offended by language 
which it deems inappropriate.  But the workplace is not the dance 
of a minuet and employers are not nursemaids.  As judges we will 
rue the day we sat in judgment of the propriety of speech which 
should transpire in the workplace between an employer and his 
employee.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
                                 
                         
 
